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Proponents of RPM argue that RPM helps to sustain a high level of service at the point of sale
and that such a high level is efficient. This paper provides a simple model which leads to the
following conclusions: 1) RPM may increase or decrease the level of service. 2) Whether the
service level is more efficient under RPM does not depend on the fact that service increases due
to RPM. It may be lower under RPM and more efficient. 3) Whether the service level is more
efficient depends on the characteristics of the heterogeneous consumers. A feature of the model
which deviates from those found in the literature is the introduction of a class of consumers who
do not search but decide on a purchase spontaneously.
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Resale Price Maintenance and the Service
Argument: Efficiency Effects
The issue of resale price maintenance (RPM) has a long history. In the
English-speaking world one attributes its beginning to the pricing of Alfred
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (Breit (1991)). However, the evidence for
RPM reaches back for a considerably longer time(Picot (1991)). But it is not
merely a greeting from the distant past. Every once in while it becomes a hot
topic. In March 2005 the Swiss Competition Commission (WeKo) prohibited
a RPM arrangement of the Swiss book trade (WeKo (2005)). Germany had
recently a debate on resale price maintenance in the book trade which led to
the remarkable situation that resale price maintenance is mandatory by law in
this sector (since 2002), while it is forbidden per se for all other sectors.
These decisions are obviously in considerable conflict to each other.
Theoretically, this could reflect the ambivalent evaluation of RPM by the
profession, where a positive attitude on the grounds of efficiency within a
supply chain is counterbalanced by concerns about competition impeding
effects. The efficiency defense for RPM is prominently connected to the
service argument. Unconstrained price competition is said to lead to an
inadequate supply of service. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that
proponents of RPM in the Swiss and German book trade stressed this view.
The free rider argument which posits that a customer may ask for product
information (service) in one shop and than buy at a different shop which does
not provide such information and can therefore offer the product at a cheaper
price is one – albeit an extreme - variant of the efficiency argument. Indeed,
in its extreme form this argument is not convincing in the book trade nor is it
convincing in other sectors, where the price of a commodity is low relative to
search costs. However, as Mathewson and Winter (1998) have stressed, the
service argument is more general. Unconstrained price competition can erode
the financial capability to provide high quality service. If service is valuable
to consumers they might get hurt by abolishing RPM. Hence, there is scope
for an efficiency rationale for RPM based on the service argument.
Nevertheless it has long been acknowledged that RPM may induce such a
high level of service that corresponding costs are not worth the potentially
increased utility of consumers. We will return to this point in a moment.
For a considerable time the effects of RPM on impeded competition were
connected to the fear that either producers or retailers could form a cartel
more easily. As to the start of the German form of RPM in the book trade this2
has quite some evidence to its validity. Its beginnings are usually attributed to
the fear of book sellers that mail order sellers may spoil their market. This
would support the argument that retailers can form a cartel more easily, when
RPM is available. This view is, however, dismissed by most commentators for
the current situation in the book trade. But it is not claimed here that RPM
does not have any relevance for cartel behavior. For a recent contribution on
this issue see e.g. Rey and Vergé (2002). In the context of the present paper
we will abstract from the consequences of RPM on cartelization and focus on
the efficiency effects of the service argument in its pure form.
This question has been taken up in the literature before. Much of this
literature has stressed a situation where firms use RPM to induce higher
prices and service (e.g. Comanor (1985), Scherer and Ross (1990)). But it is
known (e.g. R. Winter (1993)) that RPM may be used to increase or to
decrease the level of point of sales service together with prices. Winter shows
that price and service will increase due to RPM, if consumers are more
sensitive to price competition than to service competition, but that price and
service will decrease, if consumers are more sensitive to service competition
than to price competition (this argument will be made more explicit in the
main body of the paper). Winter’s paper also provides a specific model of the
demand side which supports the view that consumers are more sensitive to
price competition – thus fuelling the predominant view that RPM increases
prices and the level of service.
When the British RPM arrangement in the book trade (the net book
agreement (NBA)) broke down around 1995, commentators reported that the
prices for some books increased while prices decreased for other types of
books (Monopolkommission (2000)). It is therefore one aim of the present
paper to provide a simple parsimonious  model of the demand side which
allows for both consequences of RPM to occur.
This turns out to be desirable also from another perspective. The efficiency
results in the present paper do not depend on whether RPM increases or
decreases service and price. To the best of my knowledge this result cannot be
found in the literature. Instead, whether RPM increases or decreases
efficiency depends on the characteristics of two types of consumers which are
modeled in the present paper.
Consumers of the first type choose the retail outlet which promises the best
mix of service, price, and other characteristics of the outlet. These are
modeled similarly to the demand side in Winter (1993). The second type
consists of consumers who spontaneously decide to visit a store. They do not
reason where to shop and do not compare retail outlets before a potential
purchase. They just want to see whether there is something on offer which is
worth its price. A considerable part of demand in many retail sectors is said to3
be due to this type of consumers. In the model of the present paper their
presence is responsible for the fact that prices and service may decline due to
RPM.
Some antitrust authorities like the Swiss competition commission (WeKo
(2005)) argue that an increased demand due to higher service (induced by
RPM) is a necessary condition for efficiency improvements due to RPM. In
the model of the present model this condition is satisfied. But this property
does not depend on demand-increasing service. RPM may increase demand
also by decreasing price (and service) and this case can occur in our model. It
is then argued, that in principle an efficiency evaluation has to weigh the
change in consumer surplus against changes in profits. In principle this is true
of course. But if the authority follows Comanor (1985) (as the WeKo decision
does) an increase in demand which follows higher service due to RPM
increases efficiency, if demand shifts up parallel due to increased service. The
model of the present paper shows that is not necessarily the case. In fact the
demand side of the present model has the property of parallel shifting
demand, but efficiency may be higher under RPM or not. It very much
depends on subtleties of the demand side and on the incentives of the
manufacturer to counterbalance the desire of retailers to increase price.
Hence, if Comanor is read as saying that a reasoned judgment on the
efficiency effects of RPM is quite difficult in practice, the present paper
strengthens this position. It is shown that efficiency can indeed rise or fall due
to RPM despite the fact that the demand side has a simple linear structure.
The difference to the classic paper by Comanor is due to the fact that
retailers have market power in the present paper and that the manufacturer
uses non linear wholesale prices. This is in line with the contribution of
Winter (1993). His paper makes no general claims with respect to welfare
(with the exception of a numerical example, which point at a decrease of
welfare due to RPM).
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 1
provides the model used in this paper together with some supporting
arguments as to the modeling approach. Section 2 establishes the equilibrium
result and section 3 establishes results on consumer surplus and welfare.
Section 4 concludes and relates the result to different additional contributions
in the literature.
1. The model
The general modeling approach follows closely that of R. Winter (1993). One
monopolistic manufacturer produces goods which are sold by two sellers to4
the consumers. This fits the situation in the book trade quite well. The product
is a book title and its copyright belongs to exactly one publisher. The retail
sector of this trade is not particularly concentrated but some (local) market
power is certainly relevant. Modeling competition as a duopoly without much
bargaining power vis à vis the manufacturer seems therefore adequate. From
this it should be clear that interbrand competition is not modeled. We add
some remarks on this obvious omission in section 3.
According to many observers goods like books or textiles  are often bought
by incidence. A consumer strolling through a city may suddenly decide to
visit a store and to find out what is on offer, although he had no intent to do
so, when he decided to go downtown. Customers of this type typically do not
actively search. Once a store is entered he only decides whether or not a good
that he finds promising is worth its price. But he will not visit another store in
order to search for a better price (in a world without RPM). If all consumers
were of this type there would be no essential role for competition among
retailers but for showy appearances in order to attract the consumers attention.
A bookstore could more or less act like a local monopolist. In the framework
of our model this would have the consequence that non linear prices and RPM
are perfect substitutes for the manufacturer. This will become clear in a
moment.
Certainly, not all consumers are of this type. Some decide to go downtown
in order to buy e.g. a specific book or a book of a certain type ( a novel or a
textbook). These consumers will also decide ex ante where to buy. They may
prefer one store to another because it is closer in distance or because it
exhibits a nicer atmosphere. But they may also decide on the grounds of
information about price and service quality at that store.
Our model allows for both types of consumers. This deviates from the
demand model in R. Winter (1993) which only captures the second type of
consumers. We follow Winter to a large extent in modeling this type of
consumers which we call choosey consumers. But we simplify his model by
assuming that these consumers will buy one unit of the good in any case
which seems adequate in this context. Stores are modeled as being located at
the end points of a Hotelling line of length 1. There is a continuum of
consumers each characterized by its location on the line. As usual the location
can be interpreted geographically or in terms of product differentiation
(atmosphere, appearance, internet shop versus mortar and brick store). The
distribution of consumers with respect to their location is assumed to be
uniform (another simplification compared with Winter). The mass of these
consumers is denoted by β.
The service level and the price of store i is denoted by si and pi resp. The
service should be interpreted as dedicated to a specific good like a book title.5
It may include personnel being well acquainted with the good and thus being
able to advise customers properly or it may include presenting the good at a
prominent place or providing reports by critics on its content and quality in
the case of a book.
The utility of a consumer located at α when patronizing store 1 (which is
located at 0) is assumed to be
α b p es B − − − 1 1
An analogous expression denotes the utility of this consumer when he
purchases the good at store 2 (which is located at 1 and therefore α has to be
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with an analogous expression for the demand facing store 2. This presupposes
that B is large enough such that all consumers of this type buy one unit of the
good.
The class of spontaneous consumers is characterized by the utility
i i p ls A − +
when a consumer visits store i. These customers differ in their reservation
utility  A0 which is distributed uniformly in [ 0, A* ], where A* is large
enough, such that the demand at store i from spontaneous customers is equal
to the expression denoting the utility of a customer. Hence demand from both
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As for the cost structure of the firms we assume that the manufacturer has
constant marginal cost which we normalize to 0 and some fixed cost which
are sufficiently small to not influence the decision variables of the publisher.
Therefore the fixed cost will be neglected in the following. The provision of
service is costly to the stores. Providing the level of si costs 2 /
2
i cs .
The pricing behavior of the manufacturer vis à vis the sellers follows again
Winter (1993). The manufacturer charges store i a price qi per unit of the good
and a fee Fi independently of the volume of sales. This captures among other
things the use of rebates which are quite common in the relationship between6
manufacturers and retailers. It also provides the manufacturer with an
instrument to work against the problem of double marginalization.
The profit of store i is therefore:
i i j i j i i i i j i j i i F cs s s p p D q p s s p p − − − = 2 / ) , , , ( ) ( ) , , , (
2 π
Without RPM stores choose their level of price and service given qi and Fi .
With RPM the price is fixed by the manufacturer and the stores can only
choose their level of service. In slight misuse of notation we denote the
equilibrium choices as pi (·) and si (·) in both cases.
The manufacturers profit is
∑
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
) )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i F s s p p D q
where under RPM pi (·) equals the price which the manufacturer chooses.
As the manufacturer has the possibility of charging non linear prices to
retailers, it should be clear that he cannot gain anything if only spontaneous
consumers exit ( β = 0 ). Both retailers are just (local) monopolists in this case
and RPM and nonlinear prices are perfect substitutes to the manufacturer.
2. The consequences of RPM for prices and service
Given the complete symmetry of the stores we will concentrate on symmetric
equilibrium configurations. Hence prices and service levels are equal for both
stores. Under RPM prices are of course equal by definition of RPM.
At some stages it will be convenient to ease notation by denoting A + β/2
as a, eβ/2b as w and β/2b as d. Thus store i now faces demand
) ( ) ( ) , , , ( i j j i i i j i j i i p p d s s w p ls a s s p p D − + − + − + =
The demand system as modeled by Winter (1993) yields a clear answer
with respect to the consequences of RPM for prices and service: It increases
both prices and service. This is not the case in our model: With RPM the price
and the service level turns out to be











The appendix provides a proof of this result as well as proofs for all other
assertions in this and the following section. At this point it should be noted7
that we impose some parameter restrictions which guarantee concavity of the
relevant profit functions. They also imply that all prices are positive.
With RPM the parameters reflecting some competition among the stores, w
and d, play no role. This is to be expected. RPM eliminates any role for price
competition. Equal prices imply that the manufacturer is exclusively
interested in aggregate demand which does not depend on w.
If RPM is not an option for the manufacturer, prices and service turn out to
be
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
)) ( ) ( ) 1 ( (
2
2
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As is evident from these expression, pRPM and pc do not coincide in general
and the same is true for sRPM and sc . It is also clear that the publisher’s profit
will be less in general, if RPM is not available. With RPM he could otherwise
choose pc as retail price and ask a price qi such that stores would choose sc.
As the optimal decision under RPM differs from these levels it must be true
that the profit of the manufacturer is smaller without RPM.
In terms of comparison we can state the following proposition, which turns
out to be more transparent, if we return to the notation at the beginning of this
section:
Proposition 1: (a) If e < l then pRPM > pc and sRPM > sc .
   (b) If e > l then pRPM < pc and sRPM < sc .
Hence depending on the parameter values prices and service may move in
different directions if RPM is enabled. Only if e = l nothing changes. Note
that e > l means that an increase in service increases the utility of choosey
consumers by more than the utility of spontaneous consumers. An increase in
service attracts more choosey consumers than spontaneous consumers.
Without RPM this is more attractive, as stores can set higher prices to cover
the increased cost of service.
This result may help to explain why prices of different types of books
developed in different directions when the NBA broke down. The demand for
scientific literature could be argued to be quite insensitive to service for those
customers who visit a book store based on an conscious ex ante decision to
buy a specific title. Well trained personnel in the content or presentation
should play a very minor role for those customers. For spontaneous customers8
a prominent presentation may be a welcome reminder that they always wanted
to buy this book. Hence e < l captures this situation and in line with our result
the prices of scientific books are reported to have declined after the NBA
breakdown. The price of pocket books on the other hand increased. At least
for novels this is also consistent with our theoretical result. Think of the
situation that you only know that you want to buy a novel of a specific genre.
Then well trained personnel becomes important as well as the presentation in
the store which speaks for a high e. For spontaneous customers the advice of
trained personnel is not that important, as they just browse around. This
speaks for a relatively small l. It is not claimed here that these arguments
explain the movement of prices in Great Britain fully. There are many more
influences than we capture in this simple model. But the facts seem quite
consistent with the result.














where εp denotes the price elasticity and εs denotes the service elasticity of
demand. The index M relates to the elasticities at the market level while the
index  r relates to the elasticities at the level of one retailer. One way of
interpreting this equality is thus: If at the level of one retailer consumers are
easier attracted by a decrease in price than by an increase in service, than
competition among stores will drive down prices. As service is worth less it
will also decrease. RPM can than be used to stabilize a higher level of service.
In Winter’s model the demand system satisfies this inequality.
Given that this characterization for a price increasing effect of RPM is
quite general (at least locally) it is not surprising that Proposition 1 is fully
consistent with this inequality. The condition in part (a) can easily be checked
to be a special case of the above inequality. But – deviating from Winter - our
demand system is flexible enough to allow for the reversed inequality to hold,
which is the case in part (b). As we have seen, casual empirical evidence
supports the view that both directions of prices can be observed after RPM is
no longer practiced.
As the level of demand plays an important role in some arguments on the
efficiency of the service level due to RPM it seems adequate to note the
following corollary:
Corollary : Market demand increases due to RPM if and only if e ≠  l .9
Moreover market demand has the form 2(a + ls – p). Hence it has the
parallel shifting property mentioned in Comanor (1985).
3. The consequences of RPM on consumer surplus and welfare
If we want to compare welfare under RPM with welfare without RPM, this is
extremely easy for e = l. In this case the same prices and service levels obtain
whether RPM is an option of the manufacturer or not. Hence, profits,
consumer surplus of both types of customers, and (therefore) welfare are not
affected by RPM. For all other parameter constellations a direct comparison
turns out to be very messy. However, consumer surplus and welfare can be
taken as functions of the taste parameter e. Using the mathematical properties
of these functions provides some clear characterizations.
It is convenient to analyze the surplus of both types of customers first. For
the type of spontaneous consumers we find that they are always better off
under RPM, as long as e ≠  l:
Proposition 2: For e ≠  l consumer surplus of spontaneous consumers, CS
sp,
is always larger with RPM than without RPM.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that without RPM retailers have more
freedom to adapt the service levels to the wishes of the choosey consumers. If
these consumers derive a higher utility from service ( e > l ), it is possible to
pass the increased costs by higher prices (as we have seen in the last section).
The same holds true if choosey consumers derive less utility. Then prices will
decrease. Hence, without RPM service and price will be more aligned with
the wishes of the choosey customers and less so with the wishes of the
spontaneous customers (relative to the RPM choices). Therefore spontaneous
customers suffer from the prohibition of RPM. This same intuition helps also
explain why choosey consumers suffer from RPM:
Proposition 3: For e ≠  l consumer surplus of choosey consumers, CS
ch, is
always smaller with RPM than without RPM.
While profits are always higher under RPM (for e ≠  l ), consumer surplus
of both types of consumers are inversely affected by RPM. From what we
developed so far, we cannot say whether the loss of consumer surplus of one
type is dominated by gains of the other type of consumers and firms.
Intuitively one might think that RPM is welfare reducing if the group of
choosey consumers is large enough ( β ). But this turns out not to be true. The10
number of choosey consumers has an impact on prices and service which is to
the detriment of the other groups if RPM is not allowed. Hence RPM may
profit these groups too much to render welfare smaller under RPM.
Fortunately, it possible to derive a local result at e = l:
Proposition 4: In a neighborhood of e = l welfare is
(a) higher under RPM (for e ≠  l ), if A is large enough and
(b) lower under RPM (for e ≠  l ), if b is large enough.
Part (a) of proposition 4 is intuitive given the results obtained so far. A is
the basic utility of spontaneous consumers. If A increases, more spontaneous
consumers will purchase a unit of the good. Hence, the utility of this group
will increase if A  does. As this group becomes more important and as it
profits from RPM, part (a) does not come as surprise.
Part (b) is bit more subtle. Suppose we are in situation without RPM. Let
us start with the reaction of price and service to an increase of e, starting from
e = l. As is clear from proposition 1 price and service will both increase. Now
b decreases the service and the price elasticity of demand. Hence cet. par.
retailers have an incentive to charge higher prices and offer lower service, if b
is increased. As in the double marginalization problem this is not in the
interest of the manufacturer. Hence he will decrease his wholesale price to
counteract this effect. In the present model the combined effect is that prices
and service will increase more due to an increase in e, if b  is larger.
Furthermore price and service changes are such that the utility of spontaneous
consumers is not affected locally. But the choosey customers gain for e > l, as
they value the increased service higher. As due to an increased b this increase
in service is higher, choosey costumers gain more. If this gain is sufficiently
large, welfare increases if RPM is not allowed or phrased otherwise, welfare
decreases under RPM.
Note that the result does not depend on whether RPM induces higher or
lower levels of service. Rather it depends on which group of consumers is
more affected by RPM.
It should also be noted that we have abstained from modeling interbrand
competition in any way. This is a serious omission of course. While it is true
in the book trade that a publisher usually holds an exclusive copyright on a
book title, books of similar types are substitutable to a certain extent. It is a
frequent result in the study of vertical restraints that negative efficiency
effects are weakened by interbrand competition (cp. Motta (2004)). But
usually these negative effects remain in existence whenever competition is not
very intense. And thus the warning included in proposition 4 that RPM may
have negative consequences in terms of efficiency seems justified.11
4 Concluding remarks
The paper introduces a specification of the demand side which allows RPM to
have different effects on prices and on service, which may increase or
decrease due to RPM.
A feature of the model which deviates from those found in the literature is
due to the introduction of a class of customers who do not search but decide
on a purchase spontaneously. This is certainly an adequate modeling strategy
with respect to the book trade. But it is also adequate for other product
markets, especially those where the price of the commodity represents a
relatively small fraction of the consumer’s budget.
While the prices and the service level are influenced by the relative
importance of those consumers who do search, the qualitative effect of RPM
on prices and service are not affected, as can be easily checked.
The findings of the paper support the view that RPM may have an
efficiency enhancing potential which always sheds doubt on a per se
prohibition of RPM – especially when other forms of vertical restraints are
not prohibited per se. But the opposite effect may also arise. RPM may be
efficiency reducing. Moreover, even in the restricted environment of the
model, the judgment of whether RPM is detrimental to efficiency or not
depends on much more delicate tradeoffs as found in the literature. Simple
indications such as an increased demand due to higher service are found to
provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for RPM to enhance
efficiency.
The most serious omissions of the model concern the absence of
competition among manufacturers and the absence of uncertainty which
certainly is of considerable importance e.g. for the production of a specific
book. Competition is only very loosely incorporated in the model as the cost
of service can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of not providing
prominent shelf space or informational service for other goods (of a rival
manufacturer). Given the vast number of retail items available shelf space is
certainly scarce and it also impossible for the personnel to be properly
informed about all items of certain genre.
There are some contributions to the literature dealing with the scarcity of
shelf space in the retail sector, most prominently by Shaffer (1991a, 1991b).
However, both papers give a minor role to retail competition. In Shaffer
(1991b) a multi-product monopolist tries to convince retailers (which all
enjoy a local monopoly) to stock their full line of products. It is shown that
one possibility of reaching the full integration result consists in imposing
RPM and paying a flat fee for shelf space. Competition is only present, as
retailers have the option to use their shelf space for presentation of12
commodities of another competitive industry which is not specified more
precisely. Aside from the fact that competition is not modeled in detail, the
desire to be present on the shelves of a book store seems to be of less
importance in the book trade contrary to the situation in other industries. At
least in Germany, publishers are not known to buy prominent shelf space as is
the case in other sectors. This is probably at least partly due to the fact that a
well organized whole-sale market exists In Shaffer (1991a) manufacturers are
perfectly competitive and sell to retailers with considerable market power.
This scenario seems not well suited for the book trade in Germany.
Contributions which address the service argument for RPM in a context of
interbrand as well as intrabrand competition are not known to the best of my
knowledge.
The success of new goods, such as books, is usually very uncertain at the
time of production. The management of the corresponding risk is therefore an
important part of the strategy of manufacturers and retailers alike. Deneckere
et al. (1996, 1997) have taken up demand uncertainty and its relationship to
RPM in two remarkable papers. They show that a monopolistic manufacturer
has an incentive to impose RPM on its sales to perfectly competitive retailers
and that this imposition may (but need not) improve welfare and even
expected consumer surplus. One driving force of the result is that retailers
have to order inventories before uncertainty unveils and that the costs of these
inventories are completely sunk. Again while a very interesting result by itself
it fits the book trade less well. The uncertainty in those papers deals with the
demand of one specific homogenous commodity. If a manufacturer produces
essentially one product this is a suitable modeling strategy. A publisher,
however, produces a whole line of new books each year. Possibilities to form
a less risky portfolio of titles are open to a publisher. In addition, it is quite
common that publishers take back unsold inventories. Hence costs related to
inventories are not completely sunk. But this drives the results of those
papers. Hence, it is not clear how the results would change if both aspects of
the book trade would be incorporated, let alone the main issue of the present
paper: the service argument.
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Appendix A1: Prices and Service with RPM
Recall that demand can be written as
) ( ) ( ) , , , ( i j j i i i j i j i i p p d s s w p ls a s s p p D − + − + − + =
and that the aim of the manufacturer is to maximize
∑
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
) )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i F s s p p D q
.
The usual argument applies to show that Fi will be set such that retailers
obtain a reservation profit of 0. This implies
2 / ) , , , ( ) (
2
i j i j i i i i i cs s s p p D q p F − − =
and the profit of the manufacturer becomes:
∑
=
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2
1
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i
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As prices are equal for both retailers with RPM, this reads in more specific
terms:




1 2 1 s s c p s s l a p + − − + + = Π
Suppose the manufacturer could directly set p and both si. Then maximizing
the profit would yield the first order conditions:
0 4 ) ( 2 2 1 = − + + p s s l a
0 = − i cs pl
Solving this system gives the expressions for pRPM and sRPM.
For these expressions to make sense, c has to be large enough which is
assumed in the following (cp. assumption A1 in appendix A2).
In our setup the manufacturer cannot directly set sRPM. It remains to be
shown that he can implement this level of service by charging a suitable price
qi to the retailers. In the RPM context the profit of retailer i is:
i i j i i i i F cs s s w p ls a q p − − − + − + − = 2 / )) ( )( (
2 π
Maximizing with respect to si gives the first order condition:15
i i cs w l q p = + − ) )( (
In order to obtain the service level sRPM, the manufacturer should therefore set
qi according to
) )( 2 ( ) )( 2 ( 2
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which establishes the result.
Appendix A.2 Prices and service without RPM
If retailers choose their price as well as the service level the profit takes the
form
i i i j j i i i i i i F cs p p d s s w p ls a q p − − − + − + − + − = 2 / )) ( ) ( )( (
2 π
which is concave in the retailers own price and service level, if c is large
enough. More specifically we will assume:
) )( , max( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( w l w l d c A + > +
The first order conditions can be written as:
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As announced in the main body of the paper we will concentrate on the
symmetric solutions. Hence we posit q1 = q2 = q and this implies p1 = p2 = p.
Then (3) becomes:
p w l l c d w l l c d q ac )) ( ) 2 (( )) ( ) 1 (( + − + = + − + +
which gives16
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) ( ) 4 (
w l l c d
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q p
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Inserting this back into the solution of (2) gives
) ( ) 2 (
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) ( ) 5 (
w l l c d





For the same reasons as in appendix A.1 the profit of the manufacturer can
now be written as
) ( ))) ( ), ( ( )) ( ), ( ( )( (
2
2 1 q cs q s q p D q s q p D q p − + = Π
Note that the first order conditions for the retailers’ equilibrium have the
form:
0 ) ( ) 2 (

























This form will be used in a moment. Consider now the first order condition


































































































































































































































and using the specific expressions for the demand system gives:
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Inserting the derivatives of (4) and (5) this condition now reads:
0 ) ) ( )( ( ) ) 1 ( ))( ( ) 1 (( = − + + − + + − + − + pw w l q w l dp d q w l l c d
Next insert p according to (4). After a series of rearrangements this can be
rewritten as.
[] [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 = + + + + − + − + + + − + q w l w w l l d c d w l w d w l l cd d a
Note that under assumption (A1) the second expression in brackets is
positive. It follows that the profit function of the publisher is concave in q.
Hence, the manufacturer will charge each seller a price of
[]
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q
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The remaining steps are conceptually simple: just insert (6) into (4) and
(5). As doing these steps and getting the result in the main part of the paper is
not that straightforward we offer some details here. Let us start with the price.
Inserting (6) into (4) gives
= + − + a p w l l c d / )) ( ) 2 ((
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The right hand side of the equation above can therefore be written as:
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Next we focus on the numerator of this expression. Note that
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Therefore we can write the numerator as follows:
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From this expression the result for the price in the main body of the paper
follows immediately. Deriving the result for s poses no problems.
Appendix A3 Comparison of prices and service levels
Let us start with a comparison of the service levels:
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Because of assumption A1 this is equivalent to w < dl.
The price with RPM is higher than the price without RPM iff
[ ]
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Again given assumption A1 this is equivalent to w < dl. Using the definition
w and d, this establishes proposition 1.
Market demand equals in the absence of RPM  ) ( 2 c c p ls a − + . Inserting
the expressions for sc and pc gives:19
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ac
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Note that sc = sRPM and pc = pRPM for e = l. e enters the demand only via w. As
sRPM  and pRPM do not depend on w market demand under RPM is constant in
e. Consider now market demand without RPM as given above. Market
demand depends on w and thus on e. The monotonicity properties of market
demand with respect to e are the same as with respect to w. Therefore we will
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Hence market demand increases iff dl > w or equivalently l > e. This implies
that market demand as function of e increases up to l and decreases from this
value onwards. Its maximum is attained at e = l where it reaches its RPM
level. This proves the Corollary.
Appendix A4 Consumer and Social surplus effects
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Hence, given the symmetry of the model total consumer surplus is
2 ) ( ) ( c c
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without RPM and
2 ) ( ) ( RPM RPM
sp
RPM p ls A e CS − + =20
with RPM. Again 
sp
RPM CS does not depend on e. 
sp
c CS  depends on e via prices
and service levels and attains the same value as 
sp
RPM CS  at e = l. This function
will rise and fall iff the expression in parantheses rise and fall. In turn this
expression rises and falls under the same conditions as market demand does.
From this it follows that is 
sp
c CS  quasi-concave attaining its maximum at e =
l. This proves proposition 2.
Given the symmetric configurations the aggregate gross utility of the
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ch
c CS  denotes consumer surplus of choosey consumers, if RPM does not
prevail and 
ch
RPM CS  if it does. We will look at the properties of 
ch
c CS - 
ch
RPM CS :
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We will check the monotonicity properties of this function. Therefore we
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RPM CS  decrease for e < l and increases for e > l. At the minimum at e = l the
function attains the value of 0. For all other values of e it must therefore attain
positive values. This proves proposition 3.
Given the expressions for the aggregate utility for both types of consumers
social surplus at symmetric solutions is therefore
2 4 / ) )( ( ) , ( cs b es B p ls A p ls A s p W − − + + + + − + = β β β
which can be rewritten as
2 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( 2 4 / ) , ( p s c l s bw Al b B A s p W − − + + + − + = β β
As at e = l prices and service levels are same under RPM and without
RPM, it is obvious that the social surplus is also the same in both situations.
We denote by Wc resp. WRPM the value of W, if the arguments ( pc, sc ) resp.
( pRPM, sRPM ) are inserted.
We consider now an increase in e which induces an increase in w without
changing any of the remaining parameters. As monotonocity and concavity
properties are preserved whether e or w are taken as variables, we will use w
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While this derivative is independent of the value of w, the derivative of Wc
will in general depend on w. In order to calculate the derivative of Wc at w =
dl ( e = l ) we need the derivative of s with respect to w at dl:
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The derivative of p with respect to w at dl is :22
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Inserting these values in (7) yields at w = dl
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From this it follows that







Therefore we need the second derivative of Wc with respect to w. As WRPM is

















































































At w = dl the second derivative of pc and sc with respect to w are:
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Inserting all of these expressions into (8) gives:
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The sign of this expression equals obviously the sign of the expression in
brackets. As the last term is negative according to assumption A1, sufficiently
large A will yield a negative sign. In this case Wc is locally concave. And so
is Wc  - WRPM. It has a maximum at e = l where it attains the value of 0. This
proves part (a) of proposition 4.
Conversely, if b is sufficiently large, then the expression in brackets becomes
positive. Hence Wc  - WRPM.is locally convex and attains its minimum at at e =
l where it attains the value of 0. This proves part (b) of proposition 4.
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